Bringing RICO to the Ring: Can the Anti-Mafia Weapon Target Dogfighters? by Heger, Matthew C.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 89 Issue 1 
2011 
Bringing RICO to the Ring: Can the Anti-Mafia Weapon Target 
Dogfighters? 
Matthew C. Heger 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Animal Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew C. Heger, Bringing RICO to the Ring: Can the Anti-Mafia Weapon Target Dogfighters?, 89 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 241 (2011). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
241 
BRINGING RICO TO THE RING:  
CAN THE ANTI-MAFIA WEAPON  
TARGET DOGFIGHTERS? 
INTRODUCTION 
Dog Number 118 had no front lips.
1
 Her nose was torn and lopsided.
2
 
Her crooked, broken teeth stood out without protection, constantly 
exposed to the air.
3
 Scar tissue layered her snout.
4
 When approached, her 
handlers warn that she‘s ―a licker.‖5 
Known to her caretakers as Fay, Number 118 was one of the more 
graphic surviving illustrations of dogfighting.
6
 Press reports describe other 
dogs as missing ears, legs,
7
 and eyes.
8
 One puppy was found with 
―maggots in its lips, nose, legs and tail.‖9 All were rescued in a single 
series of raids, arresting twenty-six people and seizing more than 500 dogs 
across eight states.
10
 This event in July 2009 was hailed as the largest bust 
of a dogfighting ring in U.S. history.
11
 
―Ring‖ may be the operative word. Illegal dogfights are not the work of 
a single law-breaker
12
 and instead constitute a form of organized crime.
13
 
Fights—particularly among avid hobbyists and professional dogfighters—
are often highly organized events with spectators, guards, agreed-upon 
 
 
 1. Robert Patrick, Dogs Show Scars from the Ring, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 2009, 
at A1 (photo by Dawn Majors). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at A4. 
 6. Id. at A1. Fay died several months after her rescue when she did not wake from her third 
surgery to reconstruct her lips. Sudden Death of Fay Saddens All, HUMANE SOCIETY OF MISSOURI 
(Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.hsmo.org/news/sudden-death-of-fay-saddens.html. 
 7. Patrick, supra note 1, at A4. 
 8. Keegan Hamilton, Dog Beat Dog, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010, at 12 (photo). 
 9. Id. at 17 (photo). 
 10. Id. at 13. 
 11. Patrick, supra note 1. 
 12. Notably, the Animal Welfare Act, which provides the federal prohibition on dogfighting, 
only pertains to ―a fight between at least two animals for purposes of sport, wagering, or 
entertainment.‖ 7 U.S.C. § 2156(g)(1) (2006) (defining ―animal fighting venture‖). Conceivably, a 
single lawbreaker could individually conduct a fight in violation of this act, particularly during 
―training.‖ However, in practice, this seems uncommon or, at least, unlikely to lead to prosecution. 
 13. See Hamilton, supra note 8, at 14, 16–17 (describing participants as ―insular criminal 
networks‖ and as a close-knit group of dogfighters covering a multistate region); BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1210 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―organized crime‖ as ―widespread criminal activities that 
are coordinated and controlled through a central syndicate‖). 
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rules, referees, side gambling, prize purses,
14
 and sometimes even 
concession stands.
15
 Like any planned event, they require networking, 
preparation, and coordination between at least two, and typically three or 
more, parties such as kennels, dog ―sponsors,‖ referees, the fight promoter, 
and spectators.
16
 In this way, dogfights often mark the synchronization of 
criminal efforts from various players, all linked together through their 
common purpose of the fighting ring.
17
 
In the quest for stronger methods to punish dogfighters, some have 
suggested turning to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO),
18
 a law originally inspired to combat La Cosa Nostra (―the 
Mafia‖).19 RICO creates criminal and civil penalties20 for using certain ill-
gotten gains to run, control, or invest in a business or ―enterprise.‖21  
RICO‘s potential application in dogfighting cases became a topic of 
media speculation in 2007 following the indictment of then-Atlanta 
Falcons‘ quarterback Michael Vick.22 Language in the indictment and 
 
 
 14. Court‘s Sentencing Memorandum at 6, 11–14, United States v. Berry, No. 09-CR-30101-
MJR (S.D. Ill. 2010) (describing typical fight scenarios); Summary of the Facts at 3, United States v. 
Vick, No. 3:07CR274 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007). In Vick, Defendant Michael Vick agreed to the 
accuracy of the Summary of the Facts as part of his plea agreement. Plea Agreement at 2, United 
States v. Vick, No. 3:07CR274 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007).  
 15. See Francesca Ortiz, Making the Dogman Heel: Recommendations for Improving the 
Effectiveness of Dogfighting Laws, 3 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL‘Y 1, 42 (2010); see also United States 
v. Frazier, 595 F.3d 304, 307–08 (6th Cir. 2010) (charges against cockfighting organizer upheld based 
on profits from admissions and concessions).  
 16. See Hamilton, supra note 8, at 16–17, 19 (giving examples of coordinated fights while noting 
role of promoter and interstate nature). Other individuals involved in a dogfight may include 
―conditioners‖ (who prepare dogs for fights), ―timekeepers,‖ or ―stakeholders‖ (who hold the prize 
money or wagers for safekeeping during the fight). FireBone, Game Dog Glossary, GAMEDOG.COM 
(May 4, 2005, 10:51 AM), http://www.game-dog.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4805. 
 17. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1587 (defining ―syndicate‖). 
 18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006).  
 19. G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO): Basic Concepts—Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1015 (1980). 
 20. This Note focuses exclusively on criminal RICO; however, RICO also allows civil suits 
brought by the Attorney General or ―any person injured in his business or property.‖ 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1964(c) (2006). Animal welfare organizations that rescue, heal, feed, house, assess, rehabilitate, and 
otherwise care for dogs rescued directly from fight busts could conceivably have the necessary 
standing to serve as plaintiffs in such a suit. Successful plaintiffs ―shall recover‖ three times the 
equitable damages, as well as court costs and reasonable attorneys‘ fees. Id. 
 21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–62 (2006). 
 22. While Mr. Vick‘s case touched off a media firestorm, he is not the first NFL player to 
participate in dogfighting. In 1993 and 1996, NFL running back Todd McNair was convicted of 
seventeen different animal neglect and cruelty charges. Lance Pugmire & Gary Klein, McNair Says 
His Case Differed from Vick’s, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/30/ 
sports/sp-mcnair30. McNair later emphasized that he was not convicted of dogfighting. Id. 
Investigators insist the dogs were used for fighting, and claim the conviction was based on cruelty 
charges simply because cruelty was easier to prove and, ―[d]ogfighting wasn‘t a big deal back then like 
it is now.‖ Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/6
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facts provided by a co-conspirator emulated language in RICO,
23
 touching 
off speculation of a future indictment against Mr. Vick under RICO.
24
 
Because the defendants in United States v. Vick ultimately pled to lesser 
charges,
25
 this potential use of RICO remains untested in court.
26
 
Since its passage in 1970, RICO has been both revered and reviled 
because of its strong penalties and broad applicability.
27
 It has been called 
―brilliant . . . [but] totalitarian,‖ ―like using a cannon to go hunting for 
squirrels,‖28 and ―the ‗nuclear weapon‘ of enforcement mechanisms.‖29 
The law is intentionally flexible, mandating its provisions ―be liberally 
construed‖30 to eradicate organized crime in the United States.31 As a 
result, prosecutors have been able to use RICO charges to address a wide 
range of criminal activity beyond the Mafia,
32
 such as corrupt government 
 
 
 23. Most notably, the Indictment and later Summary of the Facts contained repeated allusions to 
a ―business enterprise.‖ Indictment at ¶ 1(a), United States v. Vick, No. 3:07CR274 (E.D. Va. July 17, 
2007); Summary of the Facts at ¶¶ 1(a), 3, 4, 10, Vick (No. 3:07CR274); see also James Pinkerton, A 
Step Backward into Barbarism, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2007, 6:42 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/james-pinkerton/a-step-backward-into-barb_b_51046.html; William L. Anderson, 
Michael Vick and the Feds, LEWROCKWELL.COM (Aug. 20, 2007), http://www.lew rockwell.com/ 
anderson/anderson194.html. 
 24. This was not the first suggestion that RICO could be applied to dogfighters. See Amy A. 
Breyer, Comment, Asset Forfeiture and Animal Cruelty: Making One of the Most Powerful Tools in 
the Law Work for the Most Powerless Members of Society, 6 ANIMAL L. 203, 227 (2000) (briefly 
commenting on potential application of RICO to ―animal cruelty‖ in general and dogfighting 
specifically as illegal gambling). 
 25. Mr. Vick ultimately pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371 (2006). Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Vick, No. 3:07CR274 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2007). 
Some speculated that the threat of a RICO prosecution was a factor that helped motivate Vick‘s plea 
agreement. See, e.g., Pinkerton, supra note 23; Anderson, supra note 23. 
 26. Just as importantly, because such an indictment never materialized, it remains unknown if the 
Department of Justice is willing to support such a use of RICO. Subsequent dogfighting prosecutions 
have not pursued RICO charges. See, e.g., Criminal Complaint, United States v. Berry, No. 09-M-
6059-CJP (S.D. Ill. July 6, 2009); Indictment, United States v. Morgan, No. 4:09-cr-00441-CEJ (E.D. 
Mo. July 1, 2009). 
 27. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 19, at 1012–13 n.13; Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling 
of the Prosecutor’s Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (1980). 
 28. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 19, at 1012 n.13 (collecting criticisms) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 29. Pinkerton, supra note 23. 
 30. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970) (―The 
provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.‖). 
 31. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (―It is the 
purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States . . . .‖). 
 32. Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43 VAND. 
L. REV. 769, 777 (1990) (―Because RICO is such a broad and abstract crime, it is capable of 
application to a number of different types of conduct in a wide range of circumstances.‖). 
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agencies, health care fraud,
33
 securities fraud,
34
 and drug trafficking by 
police.
35
  
Compared to traditional prosecution methods, RICO provides longer 
sentences and strong asset seizure capabilities. RICO also provides a 
method of consolidating numerous offenses that may not otherwise be 
pursued by prosecutors, such as gambling and drug offenses, into a single 
charge. 
This Note examines how the existing RICO structure might be applied 
to dogfighting rings, particularly in relation to recent large busts. Section I 
examines the history of dogfighting and how it evolved to its modern 
form. Section II describes modern dogfighting, particularly in relation to 
three subgroups of dogfighters (professionals, hobbyists, and street 
fighters), as well as harms associated with the crime. Section III discusses 
traditional and non-RICO prosecutions of dogfighting, as well as some 
common barriers. Section IV provides an introduction of the criminal 
RICO statute. This includes a discussion of its legislative purpose, 
followed by analysis of the most important RICO elements and self-
imposed limits on RICO prosecutions observed by the Department of 
Justice. Finally, section V addresses if and how the typical dogfighting 
situations may fit RICO requirements. 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Dogfighting has ancient roots. Romans, renowned for their love of 
blood sports, included dog-versus-dog events in their 
gladiatorial entertainment schedules.
36
 American dogfighting most likely 
predates the Revolutionary War, when the sport was intimately tied to 
British roots.
37
 British colonists brought their dogs to the colonies to 
compete in the more popular blood sports of the day, bull- and bear-
baiting.
38
 Dogfighting rose in popularity in the 1800s as industrialization 
moved the working class into cities, making baiting sports less practical.
39
  
 
 
 33. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 781 (3d ed. 2008). 
 34. Lynch, supra note 32, at 780. 
 35. United States v. Casamayor, 837 F.2d 1509, 1510–11 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 36. Jacob Silverman, How Dogfighting Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM (July 27, 2007), http:// 
people.howstuffworks.com/dogfighting.htm; Monica Villavicencio, A History of Dogfighting, NPR 
(July 19, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=12108421. 
 37. Court‘s Sentencing Memorandum at 2, United States v. Berry, No. 09-CR-30101-MJR (S.D. 
Ill., 2010). 
 38. Id.; Ortiz, supra note 15, at 7–8. Baiting involves setting one or more dogs on another 
animal, such as a bull or bear, that is chained or confined. Sentencing Memo, supra note 37, at 2. 
 39. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/6
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Dogfighting‘s popularity was further bolstered on both sides of the 
Atlantic after Parliament outlawed baiting sports.
40
 With baiting illegal, 
dogfighting reportedly replaced baiting as a venue for both entertainment 
and gambling.
41
 This boost in English popularity was mirrored stateside.
42
 
During the 1800s, upcoming dogfights were advertised in national 
magazines.
43
 Railroads even offered discounted tickets to travel to the 
events.
44
 In 1856, New York became one of the earliest states to outlaw 
the blood sport.
45
 In the next decade, other states followed suit, but 
enforcement was lax and did little to curb dogfighting‘s popularity.46 The 
United Kennel Club (UKC)—then newly formed, but today the second-
largest purebred-dog registry in the world
47—sanctioned dogfighting, 
drafting some of the earliest rules and providing referees.
48
  
It was not until the 1930s that dogfighting was finally forced 
underground when the UKC and other influential organizations withdrew 
support.
49
 The blood sport, however, has never gone away.
50
 It resurfaced 
again in the 1950s and 1960s with the advent of the now-common ―Cajun 
Rules‖ by a former Louisiana police chief51 and the publication of 
magazines touting the blood sport, including Sporting Dog Journal and Pit 
Dog Report.
52
  
 
 
 40. Sentencing Memo, supra note 37, at 2; Ortiz, supra note 15, at 10. 
 41. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 8. While several authorities suggest that dogfighting remained a legal 
alternative to baiting, the text of Parliament‘s Cruelty to Animals Act of 1835 suggests at least a partial 
ban on dogfighting. In the relevant part, it penalizes anyone who ―shall keep or use any . . . Place for 
the Purpose of . . . fighting any Bull, Bear, Badger, Dog, or other Animal (whether of domestic or wild 
Nature or Kind), or for Cock-fighting.‖ Cruelty to Animals Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 59, § 3 (Eng.). 
Legal or not, dogfights were less visible than large-animal baiting and could more easily be staged 
indoors. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 8 n.26; LIZ PALIKA, AMERICAN PIT BULL TERRIER 23 (2d ed. 2006). 
 42. Palika, supra note 41, at 24. 
 43. Court‘s Sentencing Memorandum at 3, United States v. Berry, No. 09-CR-30101-MJR (S.D. 
Ill. 2010). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 10 n.38 (citing Rhonda D. Evans & Craig J. Forsyth, The Social 
Milieu of Dogmen and Dogfights, 19 DEVIANT BEHAV. 51, 52 (1998)). 
 46. Sentencing Memo, supra note 43, at 3. 
 47. PATRICK BURNS, AMERICAN WORKING TERRIERS 62 (2005). The UKC was formed in 1898 
after the American Kennel Club (AKC) chose not to recognize the American Pit Bull Terrier as a pure 
breed. Id. 
 48. Sentencing Memo, supra note 43, at 3. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Id. at 12. The former law enforcement officer had the foresight to include ―Rule 19: Should 
the police interfere the referee to name the next meeting place.‖ G.A. Trahan, Cajun Rules, SPORTING 
DOG ONLINE, http://www.sporting-dog.com/select-pages/cajunrules.html. 
 52. Sentencing Memo, supra note 43, at 3. 
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In 1976, dogfighting was banned federally.
53
 While illegal nationally, it 
persisted as legal or only a misdemeanor in many states until 2008 when 
the last holdouts—Idaho and Wyoming—upgraded dogfighting to felony 
status.
54
  
II. MODERN DOGFIGHTING 
A. Dogfighter Classifications 
Today, dogfighting is a felony offense in all fifty states.
55
 Despite this, 
the events thrive as a half-billion-dollar industry.
56
  
There are two basic types of modern dogfights, each with very specific 
characteristics: street fights or ―traditional‖ planned events.57 Law 
enforcement further classifies the handlers of fighting dogs into three 
general profiles.
58
 Each profile is based on the handler‘s level of 
sophistication,
59
 the amount at stake in each fight, the location of fights, 
and similar factors.
60
 The levels, from highest sophistication to lowest, are 
professionals, hobbyists, and street fighters.
61
  
Street fights represent the largest growth of fighters,
62
 fueled in part by 
the ―discovery‖ of dogfighting by urban gangs.63 Street fights are largely 
unstructured,
64
 sometimes spontaneous,
65
 and while they often include 
betting, the dogs serve more as status symbols and fight results are proxies 
for the handler‘s own masculinity or toughness, or even proxies for a fight 
between rival gangs.
66
 Street fighters tend to breed dogs haphazardly, 
 
 
 53. Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, § 17, 90 Stat. 421 (1976). 
 54. Ariana Huemer, Milestone Against Dogfighting, HUMANE SOCIETY OF UNITED STATES (Mar. 
19, 2008), http://www.hsus.org/acf/news/milestone_against_dogfighting_030708.html. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Bill Burke, Once Limited to the Rural South, Dogfighting Sees a Cultural Shift, THE 
VIRGINIAN—PILOT, June 17, 2007, http://hamptonroads.com/node/283641. 
 57. Silverman, supra note 36 (referring to traditional fights as ―professional‖). 
 58. Court‘s Sentencing Memorandum at 5, United States v. Berry, No. 09-CR-30101-MJR (S.D. 
Ill. 2010).  
 59. Id. 
 60. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 14. 
 61. Id. at 14–16; Sentencing Memo, supra note 58, at 5–7. 
 62. Sentencing Memo, supra note 58, at 7. 
 63. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 19; Agustina Guerrero, Police Say Dogfights Becoming Gang Game, 
CHI. TRIB., July, 29, 2001, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-07-29/news/0107290197_1_dog-
fighting-gang-game-anti-cruelty-society (―There is a marriage between dog fighting and gangs.‖ 
(quoting Chicago Police Sergeant Steve Brownstein)). 
 64. Silverman, supra note 36. 
 65. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 34–35. 
 66. Id. at 18–20; Sharon L. Peters, A Fight to Save Urban Youth from Dogfighting, USA TODAY, 
Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-09-29-dogfighting_N.htm; see also 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/6
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seeking size but with little emphasis on preserving bloodlines.
67
 Their 
fights are typically lower-stakes battles that ignore traditional customs and 
pit rules, sometimes inventing sadistic twists to the blood sport.
68
 An 
estimated 100,000 people participate in street fights in the United States.
69
  
At the other end of the spectrum are traditional fights.
70
 These range 
from high-stakes national and international fights
71
 to local-level events.
72
 
They are supported by a clandestine subculture of dogfighters and 
spectators.
73
 Events often require a password for entry, and guards may be 
hired to keep an eye out for police or other disruptions.
74
 
Unlike the street fight, the traditional fight relies on codes of conduct 
and ―pit rules,‖75 such as the popular Cajun Rules.76 There is a heavy 
emphasis on breeding, with bloodlines and championships closely 
monitored,
77
 reminiscent of an underground version of purebred-dog 
fancier organizations such as the UKC or AKC.
78
 This infatuation with 
pedigree makes champion and grand-champion dogs
79
 a valuable 
commodity both for winning fights, but also for breeding purposes.
80
 
Puppies from successful fighters may sell for anywhere from a few 
hundred dollars to $5,000.
81
 One professional fighter told undercover 
 
 
Silverman, supra note 36. 
 67. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 17. 
 68. Id. at 16–17 (describing the street fighting style known as ―trunking‖ in which two dogs are 
locked in a car trunk together while bets are placed on which will emerge alive). 
 69. Silverman, supra note 36. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 14. 
 72. Burke, supra note 56. 
 73. Silverman, supra note 36; Hamilton, supra note 8, at 14. 
 74. Court‘s Sentencing Memorandum at 6, United States v. Berry, No. 09-CR-30101-MJR (S.D. 
Ill. 2010); Hamilton, supra note 8, at 13. 
 75. FireBone, supra note 16. 
 76. Sentencing Memo, supra note 74, at 12. 
 77. Id. at 13–14; Ortiz, supra note 15, at 14–15.  
 78. See, e.g., AKC Rules and Regulations, AM. KENNEL CLUB, http://www.akc.org/rules/ 
index.cfm; UKC Guidelines, UNITED KENNEL CLUB, http://www.ukcdogs.com/WebSite.nsf/Web 
Pages/RegistrationPolicyRulesLaunch (requiring conformity with the club‘s breeding standards as a 
condition for registration of a dog, and offering DNA verification of pedigree). This perhaps is an echo 
of the UKC‘s influence in the early 20th century, as it sought to bring ―‗organization . . . and a 
semblance of respectability for the [American Pit Bull Terrier] breed, if not for the fighting.‘‖ Ortiz, 
supra note 15, at 10 (citation omitted). 
 79. ―Champion‖ is defined as a dog that has won three fights; whereas ―grand champion‖ 
indicates an undefeated dog with five wins. Silverman, supra note 36. These terms are identical to 
those used by the UKC and AKC to describe dogs successful in organization-sponsored shows or 
events.  
 80. Court‘s Sentencing Memorandum at 14, United States v. Berry, No. 09-CR-30101-MJR 
(S.D. Ill. 2010) (describing breeding as ―[o]ne of the most lucrative aspects of dogfighting‖). 
 81. Id. 
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officers he had sold at least seventy puppies in a single year at prices 
ranging from $1,000 to $1,500 apiece.
82
 
Traditional fights attract both hobbyists and professional handlers, and 
the main distinctions between these two types of handlers are dedication, 
reputation, and success within the covert community of dogfighters.
83
 
Professionals, sometimes called ―dogmen,‖84 dominate the fights with the 
highest stakes.
85
 Their dogs are primarily viewed as monetary investments, 
and they keep meticulous records of breeding, diet, and training of 
individual dogs.
86
 An estimated 40,000 professional dogfighters are active 
in the United States, with that number projected ―to rise as long as dog 
fighting remains lucrative.‖87 Hobbyists (also known as ―enthusiasts‖ or 
―fanciers‖)88 tend to stay closer to home, own fewer dogs, and have a 
greater interest in the gambling and entertainment aspects of the blood 
sport.
89
 Both hobbyists and professionals differ strongly from street 
fighters in philosophy.
90
 
While outsiders are viewed skeptically, professional and hobby 
dogfighters maintain close communication.
91
 Their business and 
entertainment interest in bloodlines and fight results spawns underground 
magazines, journals, and websites.
92
 Business-like meetings discussing 
these issues often precede fights.
93
  
 
 
 82. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 14, 16. 
 83. Burke, supra note 56 (―True dogmen ‗are like the Yankees or the Red Sox—major league 
players . . . The guys on the local level, they‘re more like the Tides or Tidewater Sharks—bush-
leaguers.‘‖(quoting former dog breeder)).  
 84. Dogfighters consider the term ―dogmen‖ to denote a kind of professional respect for another 
dogfighter or breeder. See Burke, supra note 56. 
 85. Winnings from a large professional fight can range from $50,000 to $2 million dollars. 
Sentencing Memo, supra note 14, at 13. For comparison, Michael Vick (arguably either a professional 
or a particularly well-financed hobbyist) was accused of fighting dogs for purses ranging from $1,000 
to $26,000. Summary of the Facts, supra note 80, ¶¶ 18, 50. 
 86. Sentencing Memo, supra note 80, at 6. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 16. 
 89. Id.; Sentencing Memo, supra note 80, at 6. 
 90. One dogfighter compares professional fighters to the Mafia and streetfighters to gangs. Ortiz, 
supra note 15, at 16–17.  
 91. Id. at 15. 
 92. Id.; Burke, supra note 56 (noting the Internet as especially important to dogfighter 
communication, including webcasts of fights to allow offshore betting). 
 93. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 15. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/6
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B. Animal Cruelty 
The abuses suffered by dogs at the hands of their owners are often 
constant, with the brutality of the fight itself typically only serving as the 
culmination of a life of cruelty.
94
 ―Training‖ begins during puppyhood and 
may include being chained onto treadmills, forced to swim for hours, or 
dragged for miles behind a moving vehicle.
95
 Dogs are commonly kept 
either in small cages
96
 or on heavy chains locked to thick collars that 
create raw, open wounds.
97
 They live with little shelter, are fed only once 
or twice a week, and have infrequent access to clean water.
98
 The dogs are 
generally neglected and receive little to no socialization.
99
 A dog that fails 
to show adequate animal-aggression or interest in fighting may be killed, 
abandoned, or used as bait for other dogs.
100
  
Dogs are frequently injected with steroids or other illegal drugs, beaten, 
burned, or starved in an effort to increase aggression.
101 
They are also 
commonly disfigured by cutting off tails (―docking‖), or ears (―cropping‖), 
or filing their teeth.
102
 Dogfighters rarely seek professional veterinary care 
for such procedures and perform the operations ―with dull, unsterilized 
objects, such as scissors or knives, without any anesthetic and without 
proper medical attention.‖103  
Dogs that lose fights are frequently killed immediately to destroy 
evidence, maintain credibility, and to avoid the cost and difficulty of 
rehabilitation.
104
 These killings are often gruesomely performed—shot, 
 
 
 94. Court‘s Sentencing Memorandum at 8–9, United States v. Berry, No. 09-CR-30101-MJR 
(S.D. Ill. 2010); Ortiz, supra note 15, at 40–41; Humane Society of Missouri (―HSMo‖), Rescued from 
a Heinous Blood Sport, TAILS, Fall 2009, at 6, 8. In the interest of brevity, this Note only presents an 
overview of abuses. 
 95. HSMo, supra note 94, at 8; Sentencing Memo, supra note 94, at 10. 
 96. Silverman, supra note 36. 
 97. HSMo, supra note 94, at 8–9, 11 (including photographs). 
 98. Id. at 8. 
 99. Id. at 8. Human and animal socialization is critical to the development of domestic dogs, 
particularly the human-focused bully breeds favored by dogfighters. Palika, supra note 41, at 16. 
Dogfighters prey on this unusually strong desire to please as a means of encouraging ―gameness‖ or 
tenacity in the pit, turning the dog‘s love into the instrument of its own torment. See Ortiz, supra note 
15, at 14; Sentencing Memo, supra note 94, at 8; HSMo, supra note 94, at 11; Hamilton, supra note 8. 
 100. Court‘s Sentencing Memorandum at 11, United States v. Berry, No. 09-CR-30101-MJR 
(S.D. Ill. 2010); Summary of the Facts at ¶¶ 12, 32, United States v. Vick, No. 3:07CR274 (E.D. Va. 
2007). 
 101. Sentencing Memo, supra note 100, at 9. 
 102. Id. at 9–10. 
 103. Id. at 10. 
 104. Id. at 14–15. 
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drowned, hanged, strangled, beaten, burned alive, chemically burned alive, 
electrocuted—and done in part for the crowd‘s amusement.105  
The animal cruelty is not limited to the animals raised by the dog 
fighter. Some dog fighters use other animals as bait, sometimes including 
abducted household pets.
106
 
C. Associated Social Problems 
Beyond the dog‘s suffering, dogfighting is intimately linked to other, 
non-animal crimes and social ills.
107
 Far from occurring in isolation, 
dogfights have been called ―convenience stores for criminals.‖108 
The most obvious among these is illegal gambling, which is integrally 
connected to dogfighting.
109
 Gambling makes a dogfighting venture 
lucrative.
110
 Illegal gambling at dogfights typically comes in two main 
forms: spectator bets and a fight purse.
111
 A single fight will involve tens 
to hundreds of thousands of dollars in betting volume, not counting the 
price of admission.
112
 The fight purse itself is funded by the owners, who 
each put up half; winner takes all.
113
 
Violence, guns, and drugs also accompany dogfighting.
114
 A survey of 
thirty-seven raids nationwide from 1999 through 2004 found police seized 
either guns or illegal drugs—and usually both—at all but two raids.115 
 
 
 105. Id.; HSMo, supra note 94, at 8; Hamilton, supra note 8, at 17 (quoting undercover 
investigators saying dogfighters ―spend months with a dog and smile before a fight and talk about how 
good they are. And then they execute them in a second when they don‘t fight well.‖). Notably, the 
dogs do not typically kill each other, leaving the fight loser to be disposed of by their disappointed 
master. See Hamilton, supra note 8, at 19; Sentencing Memo, supra note 100, at 12; see also Trahan, 
supra note 51. 
 106. See, e.g., Jamie Welham, Petnapper Returns Marion Dill’s Cat Grabbed as Dog Fight Bait, 
CAMDEN NEW JOURNAL, Mar. 17, 2011, http://www.camdennewjournal.com/news/2011/mar/ %E2% 
80%98petnapper%E2%80%99-returns-marion-dills-cat-grabbed-dog-fight-bait. 
 107. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 39–40; Mich. St. U. Coll. Law, Dog-Fighting Raids: A Comparative 
Analysis of Peripheral Criminal Activity and Seizures, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CTR., http:// 
www.animallaw.info/articles/art_img/dog_fighting_raids_chart_summary.doc (last visited Sept. 1, 
2011). 
 108. Sentencing Memo, supra note 100, at 16. 
 109. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 15, at 51; Silverman, supra note 36; Burke, supra note 56 
(quoting spokesman for the South Carolina Attorney General‘s Office); Sentencing Memo, supra note 
100, at 15; Summary of the Facts at ¶¶ 4, 13, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, United States v. Vick, 
No. 3:07CR274 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 110. See Guerrero, supra note 63. 
 111. See Ortiz, supra note 15, at 51. 
 112. Silverman, supra note 36; see also Guerrero, supra note 63. Hamilton reports on a fight with 
approximately forty attendees and an admission price of $20. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 17, 19. 
 113. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 51. 
 114. Dog-Fighting Raids, supra note 107. 
 115. Id.  
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Weapons listed as seized from the various busts included a TEC-9 semi-
automatic handgun, bulletproof vests, sawed-off shotguns, explosives, and 
a bomb.
116
 The multistate raid of 2009 uncovered drugs 
(methamphetamine and crack cocaine), drug production operations 
(marijuana grow operations), more than one hundred guns, and around 
$60,000 in stolen property.
117
 Stories of dogfights-turned-people-fights 
abound, often revolving around bet welshers or sore losers.
118
 In addition 
to street fighters‘ links to gang activity, dogfighters also associate with 
other criminal groups; for example, dogfighters hired a ―known domestic 
terrorist group‖ as muscle to guard fights in Missouri.119  
Perhaps most troubling are the child welfare implications of 
dogfighting. Enthusiasts commonly see the blood sport as a family 
event.
120
 In urban areas, dogfights serve as an introduction to gang life,
121
 
especially among poor urban youths without many entertainment 
options.
122
 Many active street fighters are teenagers,
123
 with younger 
children watching or actively participating.
124
 A 2001 survey of Chicago 
second- to eighth-graders found more than 20 percent had attended a 
dogfight,
125
 and evidence suggests fights have grown in popularity since 
then.
126
 The early introduction to animal cruelty, especially repeated acts, 
impacts development and has strong links to later interpersonal 
violence.
127
  
 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Tabatha Wethal, Saving Man’s Best Friend from Dog’s Worst Enemy, LAW ENFORCEMENT 
TECH., Mar. 2011, http://let.epubxpress.com/link/let/2011/mar/12?s=0. 
 118. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 8, at 19–20 (describing bet welsher who fled fight and was 
chased, ending in an armed standoff defused by undercover officers); Ortiz, supra note 15, at 51–52 
(describing losers who subsequently broke into winner‘s home seeking lost money, shot winner in 
front of his wife and children, and fled with $500,000 while allowing winner to bleed to death); Julie 
Straw, Yazoo Co. Sheriff Is Looking for Person of Interest in Dog Fight Murder, WLBT NEWS (Jan. 
21, 2011, 8:10 PM), http://www.wlbt.com/Global/story.asp?S=13943276. 
 119. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 13. This connection ultimately led to undercover agents 
infiltrating a multistate ring and pulling off the largest dogfighting bust in U.S. history. 
 120. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 42 n.207 (collecting sources). 
 121. Guerrero, supra note 63. 
 122. Id. (―A 7th grader told us a dogfight is the most exciting thing in his neighborhood and that 
dogfights are the place to meet girls.‖ (quoting Gene E. Mueller, then-president of Chicago‘s Anti-
Cruelty Society)). 
 123. Peters, supra note 66. 
 124. Guerrero, supra note 63. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Peters, supra note 66 (citing the Vick case as generating more interest among urban youth). 
 127. See generally, e.g., Suzanne E. Tallichet & Christopher Hensley, Exploring the Link Between 
Recurrent Acts of Childhood and Adolescent Animal Cruelty and Subsequent Violent Crime, 29 CRIM. 
JUST. REV. 304 (2004); Michael G. Vaughn et al., Correlates of Cruelty to Animals in the United 
States: Results from the Nat’l Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, 43 J. 
PSYCHIATRIC RES. 1213 (2009). 
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III. TRADITIONAL DOGFIGHTER PROSECUTIONS 
Recently, dogfighting has become a felony in all fifty states.
128
 
However, state penalties and definitions of the crime vary widely.
129
 In 
North Carolina, first-time offenders face four to eight months in prison.
130
 
In Georgia, first-time offenders face one to five years in prison.
131
 Most 
commonly, states classify dogfighting as a Class C,
132
 Class D,
133
 or 
comparable mid- to low-level felony, although several states allow prison 
sentences of up to five years.
134
 A slim minority of states (twenty-one) 
may impose fines,
135
 ranging from $500 in Maine
136
 to a mandatory 
minimum of $5,000 in Georgia for first offenses and $15,000 for 
subsequent convictions.
137
 
States also vary in how they prosecute related offenses, most notably if 
and how the state law punishes (1) ownership of dogs for fighting and (2) 
being a spectator at a dogfight.
138
 Ownership or possession of fighting 
dogs is illegal in all states, although each state punishes the offense to 
varying degrees.
139
 Far more variation occurs in the punishment of 
spectators, who face felony charges in twenty-four states (and Washington 
D.C.) and misdemeanor charges or less in twenty-five states.
140
 Spectating 
at a dogfight is legal in Montana.
141
 Another variation is that state laws 
may not punish the knowing sale of fighting dogs, a problem that can 
thwart prosecutions in otherwise promising cases.
142
 
 
 
 128. Huemer, supra note 54. 
 129. See Hanna Gibson, Chart of State Dogfighting Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR., http:// 
animallaw.info/articles/ovusstatedogfightingchart.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2011). 
 130. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-362.2, 15A-1340.17(c) (2007). 
 131. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-37(b) (2007). 
 132. Gibson, supra note 129 (Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, North Dakota, Oregon, and 
Washington). 
 133. Id. (Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, and Nevada). 
 134. Id. (Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, Montana, South Carolina, Vermont, and West 
Virginia). 
 135. Id. 
 136. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1033(1-A) (2006). 
 137. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-37(b) (2007). The Georgia fine may be imposed either in addition to 
or in lieu of imprisonment. Id. 
 138. Gibson, supra note 129. 
 139. Id. Possession of a dog for fighting is a misdemeanor or less in Nevada, New York, Texas, 
and West Virginia. Id. 
 140. Id. In some states where being a spectator is a misdemeanor crime, it may be a felony for 
repeat offenders. See Dogfighting: State Laws, HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES (updated 
June 2011), http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/animal_fighting/ dogfighting_statelaws.pdf.  
 141. Id. 
 142. See Patrick McNamara, Pair Acquitted in Dog Fighting Case, THE EXPLORER (Ariz.), Nov. 
26, 2008, http://www.explorernews.com/news/pima_pinal/article/06c94b9c-bf5f-599d-848c-4a2d7489 
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This wide variation in state penalties has served to encourage 
dogfighters to participate in interstate travel,
143
 increasing the importance, 
relevance, and legitimacy of federal intervention. Regardless, the majority 
of dogfighting convictions occur under state law.
144
 
In 1976, Congress made participation in animal fighting a 
misdemeanor through amendments to the Animal Welfare Act.
145
 The Act 
created offenses for (1) sponsoring a dog ―in an animal fighting venture,‖ 
(2) ―buying, selling, delivering, possessing, training, or transporting‖ fight 
dogs in support of such a venture, and (3) using interstate communication 
such as mail to ―promote or further‖ such a venture.146 However, federal 
prosecutors rarely pursued dogfighting cases, leaving state laws as the 
dominant form of prosecution.
147
 This spurred Congress to strengthen 
federal penalties as the Michael Vick case was ongoing, bumping 
dogfighting up to felony levels with a maximum penalty of five years.
148
 
In spite of the criminal penalties that have been in place for decades (in 
some cases, for over a century),
149
 dogfighting convictions have remained 
uncommon.
150
 A number of influences have been attributed to this dearth, 
including varied legislative value of the crimes, low priority from law 
enforcement, prosecutorial inexperience, problems locating the activity, 
unwilling witnesses, and an almost necessary over-reliance on 
 
 
abcc.html. 
 143. Burke, supra note 56. 
 144. See Animal Abuse Crime Database, PETABUSE.COM, http://www.pet-abuse.com/pages/ 
cruelty_database.php (hyperlink, then ―Fighting,‖ then ―dog (non pit-bull)‖ then hold shift and ―dog 
(pit bull),‖ then ―select status‖ of ―convicted/civil,‖ then ―Search‖) (last visited Sept. 1, 2011). 
 145. Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, § 17, 90 Stat. 421 (1976).  
 146. 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)–(c) (2006). 
 147. H.R. REP. NO. 110–27, pt. 1, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2007 U.S.C.C.A.N. 37, 38 (―Federal 
authorities have pursued fewer than a half dozen animal fighting cases [between 1976 and 2007], 
despite receiving numerous tips from informants and requests to assist with state and local 
prosecutions.‖). 
 148. Enforcement of Animal Fighting Prohibitions, 18 U.S.C. § 49 (2006 & Supp. 2010); Animal 
Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–22, 121 Stat. 88 (2007) (creating 
felony offense); Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–234, 122 Stat. 923, 
§ 14207(b) (increasing maximum penalty from three years to five years). 
 149. New York is regarded as passing the first U.S. anti-dogfighting statute in the mid-1800s. Dog 
Fighting FAQ, AM. SOC‘Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (ASPCA), http://www. 
aspca.org/fight-animal-cruelty/dog-fighting/dog-fighting-faq.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2011); Ortiz, 
supra note 15, at 10 n.38, 21 n.99. 
 150. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 7; Steve Brownstein, Voice of the People: Animal Cruelty Is All But 
Ignored, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 2009, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-09-30/news/0909290352_ 
1_animal-cruelty-dog-fighting. The problem is not limited to dogfighting but strikes animal cruelty in 
general. See Jennifer H. Rackstraw, Reaching for Justice: An Analysis of Self-Help Prosecution for 
Animal Crimes, 9 ANIMAL L. 243, 245–47 (2003) (citing studies suggesting 3 percent of complaints or 
fewer lead to prosecution, and less than half of those lead to convictions). 
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circumstantial evidence.
151
 Confusion over enforcement authority further 
stymies prosecution, with some cities relegating the enforcement to 
undertrained, underequipped groups, such as animal control departments, 
that may lack the necessary tools to investigate a fighting ring, much less 
build the necessary evidentiary support for a prosecution.
152
  
Investigative costs may also discourage investigation and prosecution, 
particularly when weighed against the often light penalties for dogfighting. 
As an example, the largest fight-ring bust in the U.S. entailed acquiring 
remote farmland, purchasing forty fight dogs, keeping two officers 
undercover for eighteen months, and participating in fights.
153
 More than 
500 dogs were rescued from twenty-nine sites in eight states with twenty-
six arrests.
154
 The resulting convictions ranged from twenty-four months in 
federal prison
155
 down to only probation.
156
 The strongest of these 
sentences was only achieved through an upward departure from federal 
sentencing guidelines in recognition of ―extraordinary cruelty.‖157 
Meanwhile, expenses to care for seized animals were assessed around 
$350,000.
158
 While these results only represent a portion of one unusually 
large investigation, there are few large cases that can serve as a template 
for fighting this type of crime.
159
 Investigations that last as long as, or 
longer than, the prison terms handed down to offenders could 
understandably be discouraging, particularly since dogs are often viewed 
as merely property and the tertiary effects of dogfighting may be 
unrecognized.
160
 Without stronger penalties and recognition of the 
 
 
 151. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 27–39. 
 152. Id. at 30–31; Brownstein, supra note 150. 
 153. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 13, 16; HSMo, supra note 94, at 8, 10.  
 154. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 13. The number of dogs seized increased dramatically as pregnant 
dogs gave birth to more than one hundred puppies. HSMo, supra note 94, at 10. 
 155. See, e.g., Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Addison, No. 3:09-cr-30101-
005-MJR (S.D. Ill. 2010) (24 months); Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Bacon, No. 
3:09-cr-30101-003-MJR (S.D. Ill. 2010) (16 months); Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States 
v. Creach, No. 4:09-cr-00441-CEJ (E.D. Mo. 2009) (18 months); Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, 
United States v. Hihath, No. 09-06007-01-CR-SJ-ODS (W.D. Mo. 2010) (16 months). 
 156. See, e.g., Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2, United States v. Makstaller, No. 09-06007-03-
CR-SJ-ODS (W.D. Mo. 2010). 
 157. See United States v. Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078, 1080, 1082 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 158. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 6, United States v. Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(No. 09-3948). 
 159. See Hamilton, supra note 8, at 16 (―We joked with our bosses early on . . . . They‘d always 
go, ‗Don‘t reinvent the wheel. Do this and do that.‘ We‘re going, ‗Reinvent the wheel? This has never 
been done before. We are inventing the wheel!‘‖ (quoting an undercover investigator) (emphasis in 
original)). 
 160. See Breyer, supra note 24, at 228. 
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organized nature of the crime, traditional prosecution of dogfighting under 
current laws may seem not worth the effort. 
IV. RICO 
A. Introduction to RICO 
Organized crime came into Congress‘ sights in 1950 when Senator 
Estes Kefauver famously and publicly investigated the extent and 
influence of crime syndicates.
161
 The Kefauver Committee‘s findings 
included notes on the ―perplexing problem‖ of syndicates using crime 
profits to purchase legitimate businesses, infiltrating industries from 
baking to banking, garments to gas stations.
162
 In the next decade, the 
McClellan Committee (sometimes called the ―Valachi Hearings‖163 after 
key witness Joseph Valachi) reiterated, confirmed, and expanded on the 
Kefauver Committee‘s work, most importantly exposing the structure of 
the Mafia in great detail.
164
 
With this background, Congress passed the Organized Crime Control 
Act of 1970,
165
 a set of ―legal tools‖ designed to ―eradicat[e] organized 
crime in the United States.‖166 Included among the Act‘s many tools was 
the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.
167
 In 
the most basic sense, RICO criminalizes the running, controlling, or 
acquiring of an ―enterprise‖ (or interest in an enterprise) through 
racketeering or the collection of illegal debt, and provides civil remedies 
for those injured by such activity.
168
  
While RICO was developed with an eye to take down the Mafia, it was 
written to serve as a very adaptable tool.
169
 It has been used to battle a 
wide range of criminal activity beyond the Mafia,
170
 such as government 
 
 
 161. See S. REP. NO. 82–141 (1951). 
 162. SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 
THIRD INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. NO. 82–307, at 170–71 (1951). The report cites organized criminal 
involvement in many industries conceptually similar to a typical dogfighting venture, including sports 
(bowling, basketball, boxing, football, dog and horse racing), gambling houses, and general 
entertainment (―amusement industry,‖ taverns, bars, nightclubs, theaters). Id. 
 163. See, e.g., Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 315–16 (1st Cir. 1968); Zannino v. 
Arnold, 531 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir. 1976).  
 164. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 19, at 1015. 
 165. Pub. L. No. 91–452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). 
 166. Id. at 84 Stat. 923. 
 167. See RICO, supra note 18. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 19, at 1011–12. 
 170. Lynch, supra note 32, at 777. 
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corruption,
171
 health care fraud,
172
 securities fraud,
173
 and police 
corruption.
174
 Despite being developed to address organized crime and 
being embedded in a Congressional act dedicated to that effect, RICO 
itself is not limited to prosecution of organized syndicates or syndicate 
participants.
175
  
Criminal RICO offenders face steep penalties including substantial 
fines and twenty years of prison time.
176
 RICO also provides powerful 
forfeiture procedures, requiring the forfeiture of the offender‘s interest in 
any enterprise.
177
 As a result, offenders can lose both their freedom and 
their livelihood.  
B. Prohibited Activities 
RICO criminalizes four variations of the same basic theme.
178
 All 
involve a ―person,‖ acting through either ―a pattern of racketeering‖ or the 
―collection of illegal debts‖ to affect an interest in an ―enterprise.‖179 First, 
income acquired through racketeering or illegal debts may not be used to 
purchase interest in an enterprise.
180
 Second, the racketeering proceeds or 
illegal debts may not themselves be used to gain or maintain interest in an 
enterprise.
181
 Third, an enterprise may not conduct its affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering or the collection of illegal debts.
182
 Finally, any 
conspiracies to commit the above acts are prohibited.
183
  
 
 
 171. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 33, at 781. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Lynch, supra note 32, at 780. 
 174. United States v. Casamayor, 837 F.2d at 1509, 1510–1 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding RICO 
conviction of three narcotics officers who supplied cocaine to drug traffickers). 
 175. H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243–49 (1989) (―The occasion for Congress‘ 
action was the perceived need to combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to 
enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited 
in application to organized crime.‖); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983) (―Congress‘ 
concerns were not limited to infiltration. The broader goal was to remove the profit from organized 
crime by separating the racketeer from his dishonest gains.‖). 
 176. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 49 (Supp. 2010) 
(establishing maximum dogfighting prison sentence at five years). 
 177. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006). 
 179. Id. 
 180. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006). For example, this applies where the criminal activity is used to 
acquire capital, then that capital is used to purchase a business. 
 181. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (2006). This applies where the criminal activity (as opposed to the 
capital acquired through the criminal activity) is used to acquire or control the enterprise interest.  
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006). 
 183. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006). 
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RICO proceedings are most commonly based on the last two of these 
four variations.
184
 Thus, the most typical case requires proof that (1) the 
defendant was associated, (2) with an enterprise affecting interstate 
commerce, (3) the defendant took part in conducting the enterprise‘s 
affairs, and (4) that defendant‘s participation involved either a pattern of 
racketeering activity or the collection of unlawful debts.
185
  
1. Predicate Offenses 
RICO charges may be based either on a ―pattern of racketeering‖ or on 
the ―collection of unlawful debt.‖186 ―Racketeering‖ refers to commission 
of any of the approximately one hundred offenses (or ―predicate offenses‖) 
specifically listed within the RICO statute.
187
 Predicate offenses include 
certain state charges involving ―murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, 
robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a 
controlled substance,‖188 as well as a very expansive list of federal 
offenses.
189
 RICO requires a pattern of racketeering, meaning two or more 
occurrences of predicate offenses that represent ―continuity of racketeering 
activity, or its threat.‖190 Neither dogfighting nor other Animal Welfare 
Act violations are listed as predicate offenses under the RICO statute.
191
 
Importantly, RICO offenses based on the collection of unlawful debt 
do not require a pattern.
192
 To utilize this alternative route to prosecution, 
the debt in question must have resulted from either illegal gambling or 
 
 
 184. Lynch, supra note 32, at 774. 
 185. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006); see also, e.g., United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 855 
(5th Cir. 1998). Courts commonly describe RICO as requiring ―(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) 
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.‖ Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) 
(footnote omitted). While this is useful as shorthand, it is important to note that, strictly speaking, this 
description is a simplification that overlooks RICO claims based on collection of unlawful debts. 
 186. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006). 
 187. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006). 
 188. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2006). 
 189. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)–(G) (2006). Some predicate offenses are specifically defined; for 
example, embezzlement from pension and welfare funds in violation 18 U.S.C. § 664 (2006) would 
form one predicate offense. § 1961(1)(B). Other predicate offenses are more general. For example, any 
offense under the bankruptcy code (Title 11) involving fraud can form a predicate offense, with the 
exception of bankruptcy fraud itself. § 1961(1)(D). 
 190. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006); H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 241 (1988). 
 191. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A). One commentator suggests that, theoretically, state animal cruelty 
laws could form a RICO predicate offense where the cruelty results in an animal‘s death. See Breyer, 
supra note 24, at 227. However, the argument requires courts to accept animal cruelty as an ―act . . . 
involving murder.‖ Id.  
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Weiner, 3 F.3d 17, 23–24 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Tocco, 
200 F.3d 401, 426 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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usurious lending in excess of twice the legal rate.
193
 Unlike the 
racketeering route to prosecution, the underlying crime itself need not be 
punishable by more than a year of imprisonment.
194
 
2. Enterprise 
RICO‘s definition of enterprise is broad, extending to nearly anything 
that organized crime could infiltrate.
195
 This goes well beyond basic 
commercial entities and businesses to include ―any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.‖196 Because 
Congress defined enterprise as ―including‖ these groups, this list is 
inclusive, but not exclusive; other forms of organizations may be 
enterprises.
197
 Enterprises have included associations as diverse as the 
Palestinian group Hamas,
198
 the State of Illinois,
199
 street gangs,
200
 and a 
beauty school.
201
 
When the enterprise in question is a legal entity, proving its existence 
may be simple; however, proving the existence of an ―associated-in-fact‖ 
enterprise can be more difficult.
202
 The Supreme Court first gave some 
direction in defining this form of RICO enterprise in United States v. 
Turkette,
203
 noting that an enterprise may be an exclusively criminal 
organization.
204
 The Court held that ―association-in-fact‖ enterprises may 
be proven ―by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, 
and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing 
 
 
 193. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (2006). 
 194. United States v. Aucoin, 964 F.2d 1492, 1496 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 195. Lynch, supra note 32, at 771. 
 196. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006). 
 197. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 198. United States v. Marzook, 426 F. Supp. 2d 820, 825 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (upholding RICO 
convictions premised on providing support to foreign terrorist organization). 
 199. United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 696 (7th Cir. 2007) (upholding RICO conviction 
against former Illinois Governor George Ryan, Sr., and an advisor for selling public licenses and 
contracts). Notably, in United States v. Mandel, a district court held that the State of Maryland was not 
a RICO enterprise. 415 F. Supp. 997, 1020–22 (D.Md. 1976). Courts, including the Fourth Circuit, 
have subsequently rejected the Mandel result. See, e.g., Warner, 498 F.3d at 694–95; United States v. 
Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 200. E.g., United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1266–68 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding RICO 
conviction of leader of the ―King Mafia Disciples,‖ a Salt Lake City gang). 
 201. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding RICO conviction 
for defrauding Veterans Administration through falsifying student information). 
 202. FRANK J. MARINE ET AL., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 60–65 (5th ed. 2009) (collecting cases).  
 203. 452 U.S. 576 (1981). 
 204. Id. at 587. 
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unit.‖205 Turkette may be distilled into requiring that association-in-fact 
enterprises include the elements of (1) ―ongoing organization‖ (continuity) 
and (2) some common purpose.
206
 Continuity of an enterprise is not 
necessarily lost merely because the members of the alleged enterprise 
change over time.
207
  
Following Turkette, a circuit split developed over whether RICO 
enterprises required evidence of structure and hierarchy beyond that 
necessary to accomplish the pattern of racketeering itself.
208
 The split 
developed over language in Turkette that specified that the ―pattern of 
racketeering‖ itself is distinct from the enterprise.209 The Supreme Court 
recently resolved this division in Boyle v. United States,
210
 expressly 
rejecting the requirement that a RICO enterprise‘s structure exist ―beyond 
that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.‖211  
Instead, the Court harkened back to Turkette‘s instruction that an 
enterprise be ―a group of persons associated together for a common 
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.‖212 The Court reiterated this as 
 
 
 205. Id. at 583. 
 206. See, e.g., United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2001) (upholding jury 
instructions requiring ―[t]o find that an association in fact existed, you must find that the alleged 
enterprise had an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and that its various associates functioned 
as a continuing unit for a common purpose‖); United States v. Davidson, 122 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 
1997) (describing the enterprise as ―an ongoing association with a common purpose to reap the 
economic rewards flowing from the crimes, rather than a series of ad hoc relationships‖). 
 207. See, e.g., United States v. Nabors, 45 F.3d 238, 240–41 (8th Cir. 1995) (―[T]he personnel of 
an enterprise may undergo alteration without loss of the enterprise‘s identity as an enterprise.‖); 
MARINE ET AL., supra note 202, at 64 n.87 (collecting cases). 
 208. Compare United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir. 1982) (requiring 
―ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity‖) 
(internal quotation removed), and United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(requiring that a RICO enterprise have ―some sort of structure exist[ing] within the group for the 
making of decisions, whether it be hierarchical or consensual‖), with United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 
11, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (―We today explicitly reject the Bledsoe test as an additional requirement 
beyond the Turkette instruction.‖), and United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 88–90 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(―[I]t does not make sense to impose a ‗distinctness‘ requirement in RICO cases.‖). 
 209. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583 (―The ‗enterprise‘ is not the ‗pattern of racketeering activity‘; it is 
an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an 
enterprise at all times remains a separate element which must be proved by the Government.‖). The 
split developed as some courts expressed concerns that any overlapping set of RICO predicate offenses 
could subject defendants to greatly enhanced penalties. See Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 661–62 (―[RICO] was 
not intended to reach any criminals who merely associate together and perpetrate two of the specified 
crimes, rather it was aimed at ‗organized crime.‘‖). 
 210. 129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009). Coincidentally, ―Boyle‖ is also the name of a ―highly regarded 
bloodline‖ of fighting dogs. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 14; Top Dog, A Boyle Dogs Really Good Dogs, 
GAMEDOG.COM (June 10, 2005, 6:25 PM CST), http://www.game-dog.com/forums/showthread.php?t 
=5726. 
 211. Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2245. 
 212. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
260 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:241 
 
 
 
 
three distinct elements: a purpose, relationships among those associated 
with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to 
pursue the enterprise‘s purpose.‖213 
C. Department of Justice Approval 
Recognizing the strength of RICO and citing a hesitancy to overstep 
state law enforcement, the Department of Justice has created self-imposed 
restrictions to criminal prosecution through RICO.
214
 U.S. Attorneys 
wishing to bring criminal RICO charges must first apply to the Organized 
Crime and Racketeering Section (OCRS).
215
 A case that too heavily 
duplicates the elements of a single predicate offense ―will not be approved 
unless it serves some special RICO purpose.‖216 Furthermore, the 
Department of Justice expressly denounces using a RICO charge simply as 
a bargaining chip.
217
  
The Department of Justice offers seven considerations that individually 
may support pursuit of RICO charges.
218
 These include where the RICO 
charge (1) better reflects the nature and extent of the criminal activities, 
(2) allows more appropriate sentencing, (3) allows consolidation of 
charges across multiple jurisdictions, (4) is necessary for successful 
prosecution, (5) provides more appropriate forfeiture than the underlying 
crime, (6) enables enforcement of state law where local officials ―are 
unlikely or unable to successfully prosecute the case,‖ or (7) enables 
enforcement of state law against ―significant or government individuals‖ 
that local prosecutors would have difficulty charging.
219
 One or more of 
these must be present before a Justice Department attorney submits a 
potential RICO case to the OCRS.
220
  
 
 
 213. Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2244. 
 214. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL, § 9-110.200 (Aug. 1999), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/. 
 215. Id. § 9-110.210. 
 216. Id. § 9-110.200. 
 217. ―Inclusion of a RICO count in an indictment solely or even primarily to create a bargaining 
tool for later plea negotiations on lesser counts is not appropriate and would violate the Principles of 
Federal Prosecution.‖ Id. § 9-110.320.  
 218. Id. § 9-110.310. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
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V. APPLYING RICO TO MODERN DOGFIGHTING 
Because neither dogfighting nor other violations of the Animal Welfare 
Act constitute RICO predicate offenses,
221
 RICO‘s applicability to such a 
case may not seem apparent. However, dogfighting defendants appear to 
fit the basic legislative purpose for a RICO prosecution.
222
 The blood sport 
constitutes a half-billion-dollar industry, with professional and hobby 
fighters operating in organized rings. For some, dogfighting is a way of 
life.
223
 Dogfighters may mask their breeding operations through legitimate 
businesses, such as selling puppies as pets.
224
 The House of 
Representatives noted as recently as 2007 that nationally circulated 
magazines and websites continue to promote the sport, and lobbyists 
continue to advocate on behalf of animal fighters.
225
 Dogfights are 
committed by groups of people, often crowds, as coordinated events that 
are intricately tied to other illegal activities.
226
  
Again, a typical RICO prosecution requires proof that: (1) the 
defendant was associated, (2) with an enterprise affecting interstate 
commerce, (3) the defendant took part in conducting the enterprise's 
affairs, and (4) that defendant‘s participation involved either a pattern of 
racketeering activity or the collection of unlawful debts. When applying 
RICO to dogfighting, only two of these four prongs should prove to be 
novel: establishing the underlying RICO offense (―pattern of racketeering‖ 
or ―collection of unlawful debts‖) and defining the ―enterprise affecting 
interstate commerce.‖ Once these two prongs are established, the 
remaining two prongs involve the typically straightforward task of 
connecting the defendant to the enterprise. 
 
 
 221. See discussion of predicate offenses, supra Part IV.B.1. 
 222. The basic legislative purpose for a RICO prosecution is to enhance criminal penalties for 
patterns of criminal conduct, particularly where that conduct is continuous or threatens to be 
continuous. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (―RICO‘s legislative 
history reveals Congress‘ intent that . . . the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount 
to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.‖) (emphasis in original); United States v. Marren, 
890 F.2d 924, 936 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that ―the stated legislative purpose of RICO [was] to expand 
criminal punishment‖). 
 223. United States v. Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078, 1084 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 224. See Patrick, supra note 1, at A4 (―In court, Hackman told U.S. District Judge Carol Jackson 
that some of his dogs were sold as pets.‖). Commercial dog breeding is generally regulated by state 
laws. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 273.327 (2000). Animal ―dealers,‖ including breeders, are further 
regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture through the Animal Welfare Act. 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 2132(f), 2133 (2000). 
 225. H.R. REP. NO. 110–27, pt. 1, at 2 (2007). 
 226. Ortiz, supra note 15, at 39, 50–54. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
262 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:241 
 
 
 
 
A. Potentially Applicable RICO Predicate Offenses 
It is not surprising that dogfighting is not specifically listed as a 
predicate offense supporting RICO prosecution.
227
 Dogfighting was not 
federally criminalized until 1976, several years after RICO was enacted.
228
 
Even then, the crime remained a misdemeanor until 2007.
229
 As a result, 
any application of RICO must rely on peripheral activities to animal 
fighting. However, because of the close connection between dogfighting 
and other crimes, RICO charges could be founded under either the ―pattern 
of racketeering‖ prong or the ―collection of unlawful debts‖ prong. 
1. The Pattern of Racketeering Approach 
RICO includes several predicate offenses under its definition of 
―racketeering‖ that could potentially be useful, though many would 
depend on the evidence available in the individual case being prosecuted. 
Examples of those that may apply with limited usefulness include 18 
U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering), 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (transactions in 
property derived from unlawful activity), or felony controlled substance 
crimes.
230
 For example, if a dogfighter were to inject his dogs with illegal 
drugs such as steroids, the related drug offenses could form one or more 
predicate offenses to help establish a pattern of racketeering.
231
  
Because of frequent commission in conjunction with dogfighting, 
gambling offenses are by far the most promising ―racketeering‖ predicate 
offense. Criminal culpability can derive either from state
232
 or federal
233
 
anti-gambling statutes. 
Taking the state route, RICO charges can be predicated on nearly any 
state anti-gambling statute with one caveat: it must be punishable by 
 
 
 227. Interestingly, since the Michael Vick case, animal fighting has been added as a predicate 
offense to ―little-RICO‖ statutes in several states, including Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. OR. 
REV. STAT. § 166.715(6)(a)(T) (2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 42.10, 71.02(a)(14) (2011); UTAH 
CODE ANN. tit. 76, § 10-1602 (4)(ggg) (West 2011); VA. CODE §§ 3.2–6571, 18.2–513 (2011); Getting 
Tough on Dogfighting, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (May 21, 2009), http://www.aldf.org/ article. 
php?id=963. 
 228. Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–279, § 17, 90 Stat. 421 (1976). 
 229. 18 U.S.C. § 49 (2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 230. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (2006). 
 231. Dogfighters commonly use steroids as well as various other controlled substances to enhance 
―training.‖ Court‘s Sentencing Memorandum at 9, United States v. Berry, No. 09-CR-30101-MJR 
(S.D. Ill. 2010). 
 232. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2006). 
 233. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (2006). 
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imprisonment of more than one year.
234
 In states with typical anti-
gambling laws, this excludes ―simple gambling‖235 but would include 
players that partake in ―professional‖ gambling and those who advance or 
promote the activity.
236
 Such laws likely provide necessary predicate 
offenses against fight organizers, dog handlers, and successful or prolific 
participants while excluding those whose participation is merely as a 
spectator in a given fight. However, this route may be disfavored because 
of the Department of Justice‘s hesitancy to enforce state law through 
RICO without special reasons.
237
 As a result, a federal law foundation may 
be preferred. 
To take the federal route, RICO charges could be predicated on 
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which prohibits operation of an illegal 
gambling business.
238
 Section 1955 prohibits owning or operating a 
gambling business in violation of state laws,
239
 so it would primarily be 
applicable in areas where the state route was also available. However, it 
would also extend to states where such a gambling business was simply a 
misdemeanor, petty crime, or civil infraction. 
There are further complicating factors under § 1955. The illegal 
gambling business must also have either ―substantially continuous 
operation‖ for more than thirty days, or have gross revenue of $2,000 in 
any single day.
240
 Additionally, the illegal gambling business must 
―involve[] five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, 
direct, or own all or part of such business.‖241 
These ―gambling‖ paths to RICO may be further bolstered through yet 
another predicate offense from the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: 
the prohibition on interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of 
racketeering enterprises.
242
 This statute prohibits traveling in or using 
 
 
 234. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2006). 
 235. As used here, ―simple gambling‖ refers to lesser gambling offenses, as opposed to 
―aggravated‖ or ―professional‖ gambling. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-21 (2011) (defining crime of 
―simple gambling‖). Different states use different terminology, and many just refer to ―simple 
gambling‖ as ―gambling.‖ 
 236. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 572.020 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-7-102 (2011). 
 237. For more on the Department of Justice considerations regarding enforcement of state law, see 
Department of Justice Approval, infra Part V.C. 
 238. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006). Like RICO, this federal offense was also created through the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Id. 
 239. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(i) (2006). 
 240. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (b)(1)(iii) (2006). 
 241. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(ii) (2006). 
 242. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006). Aside from its applicability to RICO, this statute could provide a 
powerful tool for federal prosecutors bringing charges against a dogfighter yet unable to gain OCRS 
approval for full RICO charges. 
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instruments of interstate commerce to either (1) distribute income from 
unlawful activity, (2) commit ―any crime of violence‖ to further unlawful 
activity, or (3) otherwise assist unlawful activity.
243
 ―Unlawful activity‖ is 
confined to a relatively small set of crimes, including ―any business 
enterprise involving gambling . . . in violation of the laws of the State in 
which they are committed.‖244 This may prove applicable to typical 
dogfighting cases.  
In some cases, the ―pattern of racketeering‖ prong may prove 
impractical because of difficulties in establishing a pattern. Currently, 
dogfighting prosecutions tend to rely heavily on circumstantial 
evidence.
245
 This makes proving even a single instance of dogfighting a 
hurdle on its own;
246
 thus, establishing a pattern of related activities could 
prove equally burdensome. As a result, the ―collection of unlawful debts‖ 
prong may prove more practical to this application of RICO.
247
  
2. The Collection of Unlawful Debts Approach 
RICO‘s ―collection of unlawful debts‖ prong may provide a more 
straightforward path to prosecution than the ―pattern of racketeering‖ 
prong. In the applicable part, RICO defines unlawful debt as:  
a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in 
violation of the law of the United States, a State or political 
subdivision thereof, . . . and (B) which was incurred in connection 
with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United 
States, a State or political subdivision thereof. . . .
248
  
Here there is no requirement that the underlying statute that criminalizes 
gambling punish the crime as a felony—or even as a criminal offense; the 
 
 
 243. Id. § 1952(a). 
 244. See id. § 1952(b) (limiting ―unlawful activity‖ to certain crimes related to: gambling, alcohol, 
drugs, prostitution, extortion, bribery, arson, currency reporting, and money laundering). 
 245. See Ortiz, supra note 15, at 36–39. Ortiz notes difficulties including unwilling witnesses, the 
rarity of catching dogfighters during actual dogfights, and the common need to prove that the 
defendant actually caused the dogfight. Id. at 34–36. 
 246. Id. 
 247. An alternate possibility, however, is that the elements of predicate offenses may prove to be 
far easier to establish than some of the more difficult elements of dogfighting itself. For example, 
demonstrating intent often creates difficulty in dogfighting prosecutions. Id. at 36–37. Reliance on 
tertiary, non-animal-cruelty crimes may greatly enhance the ability to build a case against dogfighters 
regardless of if prosecutors utilize RICO. 
 248. 18 U.S.C. 1961(6) (2006). 
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only requirement is ―illegality.‖249 Collecting the purse or other winnings 
from a dogfight could thus serve as the foundation for the RICO claim.  
The downside of utilizing this provision is that it does not enable RICO 
claims against those individuals who lose dogfights. However, regardless 
of the winner, it could likely still be applied to the fight organizer. If the 
organizer takes a cut from the purse, bids on the fight, or otherwise profits 
―in connection with‖ the illegal gambling, there may be the beginnings of 
a RICO case. Because the fight organizer takes a leadership role in a 
dogfighting venture, this could serve as a way to ―cut off the head of the 
snake.‖250 
B. Enterprise Affecting Interstate Commerce 
While the predicate offenses constituting a RICO indictment 
necessarily must be separate from the relevant animal welfare concerns, 
dogfighting may be most helpful to prosecutions when viewed as the 
RICO enterprise.
251
 Because RICO uses such an expansive definition of 
―enterprise,‖252 the typical dogfighting operation includes several 
groupings of individuals that could potentially comprise a RICO 
enterprise.  
At the highest level, proving the existence of a dogfighting ring itself 
serves as an obvious enterprise. Such a ring would encompass the various 
kennels and individuals who coordinate on a regular basis to breed 
animals, organize fights, conduct fights, and otherwise support their 
individual dogfighting efforts.
253
 Crime rings are consistently deemed 
 
 
 249. See, e.g., United States v. Weiner, 3 F.3d 17, 23–24 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Tocco, 
200 F.3d 401, 426 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 250. ―[A]nd the body will die.‖ VIVA ZAPATA!, at 01:33:17 (Twentieth Century Fox 1952). 
 251. Because the dogfighting itself may not serve as a predicate offense, there is no danger of the 
―pattern of racketeering‖ being confused with the ―enterprise‖—the two elements will be clearly 
separate. This concern helped motivate the circuit split (resolved by Boyle) reflected in Turkette‘s 
reminder that ―[t]he existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which must be 
proved by the Government.‖ United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 574, 583 (1981). 
 252. See United States v. Boyle, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2243 (2009). 
The statute does not specifically define the outer boundaries of the ―enterprise‖ concept . . . 
encompassing ―any . . . group of individuals associated in fact.‖ The term ―any‖ ensures that 
the definition has a wide reach, and the very concept of an association in fact is expansive. In 
addition, the RICO statute provides that its terms are to be ―liberally construed to effectuate 
its remedial purposes.‖ 
Id. (internal citations removed). 
 253. To conceptualize this ―enterprise,‖ it may be helpful to compare the entire dogfighting ring to 
professional sports leagues. Many competitors comprise the whole enterprise, but each frequently 
operates with the others for common purposes. See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(National Football League as an alleged RICO enterprise) (dismissed on other grounds).  
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RICO enterprises and appear to be most consistent with the type of 
organized crime prosecution that inspired RICO.
254
 Unfortunately, while 
dogfighting prosecutions are rare,
255
 prosecution of large rings is even 
more extraordinary.
256
 As a result, the opportunity for utilizing this 
enterprise as the basis of a RICO charge may be limited. On the other 
hand, recognizing the potential for RICO charges against a dogfighting 
ring, as opposed to weaker Animal Welfare Act charges, could encourage 
such investigations by reducing the disparity between investigative costs 
and the resulting punishment that defendants face.
257
 
Another ―enterprise‖ likely to be available for a RICO prosecution is 
the group comprising an individual kennel and/or breeding operation.
258
 
Dogfighting kennels operate parallel to a legitimate business equivalent—
ordinary dog breeders. In many respects, dogfighting kennels are 
functionally similar to ordinary dog breeders. In addition to the obvious 
parallel that both raise dogs, like legitimate breeders, dogfighters typically 
name their kennels,
259
 and they sometimes hire staff.
260
 
United States v. Vick serves as an example of this level of enterprise. 
Vick involved four individuals who worked together to operate Bad Newz 
Kennels.
261
 The group shared several common purposes, including 
operation of the animal fighting venture and ―a business enterprise 
[involved in] gambling.‖262 The members operated together as co-
conspirators to accomplish these purposes over the course of six years.
263
 
 
 
 254. See, e.g., Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2239 (bank robbery ring); United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 
228, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (narcotics dealing ring); United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 742 (1st Cir. 
1994) (loan shark ring); United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1185, 1197 (8th Cir. 1982) (arson ring); 
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 885 (5th Cir. 1978) (car theft ring); United States v. McLaurin, 
557 F.2d 1064, 1073 (5th Cir. 1977) (prostitution ring). 
 255. See Ortiz, supra note 15, at 26; Joey Bunch, Prosecution of Dogfighting Cases Kept on Short 
Leash, DENVER POST, July 30, 2007, http://www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci_6495949. 
 256. See Hamilton, supra note 8, at 16 (describing investigation that infiltrated dogfighting ring in 
2008 through 2009 as entirely novel). 
 257. See Ortiz, supra note 15, at 28–29, 32. 
 258. To extend the sports league metaphor, this would represent the ―team‖ or ―franchise‖ level. 
Comparable enterprises successfully prosecuted under RICO can be found in sports bribery cases. See 
United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983) (enterprise composed of a Boston College 
basketball player and a gambling syndicate); United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(enterprise composed of horse owners who bribed jockeys and purposely lost races). 
 259. Examples include ―Cannibal Kennel,‖ ―Hard Goodbye Kennel,‖ ―Shake Rattle and Roll 
Kennel‖ (a ―roll‖ refers to a short practice fight, often against a bait animal), and ―Bad Newz 
Kennels.‖ Patrick, supra note 1, at A4; Summary of the Facts, supra note 14, ¶ 3. 
 260. See Hamilton, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that a ―yard boy‖ hired to feed, water, and ―shape‖ 
dogs served as an informant for police). 
 261. Summary of the Facts at 1, 3, United States v. Vick, No. 3:07CR274 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
 262. Id. at 1–2. 
 263. Id. 
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Thus, the kennel itself could have served to form an enterprise under 
Boyle. 
Alternately, at the lowest level, even an individual ―contract fight‖264 
and the events leading up to it could arguably be deemed an enterprise for 
RICO purposes. The actual event requires coordination from a group of 
individuals over a period of time, both in promotions prior to the event and 
during the event, which is dictated by a set of agreed-upon rules of 
conduct. This may be supported in part by the Animal Welfare Act‘s use 
of similar language, specifically prohibiting ―an animal fighting 
venture.‖265 The Supreme Court has itself noted that ―venture‖ is often 
synonymous with ―enterprise.‖266 
Structurally, a single dogfight meets the ―enterprise‖ requirements as 
outlined in Boyle. Participants share a common purpose—the pursuit of 
dogfighting for entertainment and profit. Relationships exist between 
participants, who serve in various roles like handler, breeder, or referee.
267
 
Both the relationships and the common purpose are bolstered by the blood 
sport‘s necessary use of rules.268 The longevity requirement could prove 
more difficult to demonstrate on the basis of a single fight. However, 
Boyle does not set any minimal time requirement, requiring merely that 
the enterprise‘s structure exist long enough to allow ―associates to pursue 
the enterprise's purpose.‖269 As a result, the single fight should qualify as a 
RICO enterprise.  
C. Department of Justice Approval  
U.S. Attorneys also face an administratively imposed barrier to 
applying RICO in a modern dogfighting case: they must acquire approval 
from the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department of 
Justice. Technical compliance with the RICO elements is not enough.
270
 
 
 
 264. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 13. 
 265. 7 U.S.C. § 2156(g)(1) (2006). 
 266. Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (―That an ‗enterprise‘ must have a purpose is 
apparent from meaning of the term in ordinary usage, i.e., a ‗venture,‘ ‗undertaking,‘ or ‗project.‘‖ 
(quoting Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 757 (1976)) (emphasis added). 
 267. See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Reyes, No. 09-6007-04-CR-SJ-ODS (W.D. 
Mo. 2009), ECF No. 83 (noting involvement of seven individuals in the events leading to one contract 
fight). 
 268. As noted above, traditional fights adhere to clearly outlined rules. See, e.g., Trahan, supra 
note 51. However, rules are also present in street fights. Even brutal fight formats like ―trunking‖ 
(described in footnote 68) include rules, if only to clearly identify the winner to accommodate the 
attendant gamblers. 
 269. Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2244. 
 270. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, supra note 214, § 9-110.200. The U.S. Attorneys‘ Manual acknowledges 
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The Department of Justice further requires that at least one of seven 
guidelines be present before approving a Federal RICO prosecution.
271
 
Because prosecution of dogfighting defendants under RICO is novel, an 
application for prosecution could meet extra scrutiny.
272
 But despite being 
novel, the required considerations should be present in the dogfighting 
context. 
Under the first two DOJ considerations, RICO charges are appropriate 
where prosecution of the underlying offenses does not capture the ―nature 
and extent of the criminal conduct‖ or provide appropriate sentencing 
―under all the circumstances of the case.‖273 In the dogfighting context, the 
crime involves the interplay between many criminal violations
274
 that 
could only be adequately captured by the most thorough and lengthy 
indictment of underlying offenses. For example, the July 2009 multistate 
dogfighting bust, touted as the largest in U.S. history,
275
 involved a ring of 
individuals participating in fighting-dog sales, breeding, training, fights, 
illegal gambling, multistate coordination, a near-gunfight, illegal steroid 
sales, killing of poor-performing dogs including at least one by 
electrocution, police recovery of mutilated and neglected dogs, and other 
offenses.
276
 Indictments, however, did not cover the full breadth of the 
crimes and typically were limited to conspiracy charges of ―buying[,] 
selling, delivering, possessing, training, or transporting animals for 
participation in animal fighting ventures,‖ and using the Post Office to 
promote an animal fighting venture.
277
 The resulting sentences similarly 
failed to reflect the gravity of the criminal actions, ranging from probation 
to two years in prison.
278
  
 
 
that this self-imposed policy exists ―despite the broad statutory language of RICO and the legislative 
intent that the statute ‗. . . shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose.‘‖ Id. 
 271. Id. § 9-110.310. While prior approval is required for either criminal or civil prosecution, 
approval is not necessary to conduct grand jury investigations of RICO violations. Id. § 9-110.320. 
 272. ―[T]he Criminal Division will not approve ‗imaginative‘ prosecutions under RICO which are 
far afield from the congressional purpose of the RICO statute.‖ Id. § 9-110.200. 
 273. Id. § 9-110.310. 
 274. See, e.g., Court‘s Sentencing Memorandum at 16, United States v. Berry, No. 09-CR-30101-
MJR (S.D. Ill. 2010) (stating that dogfighting is a ―convenience store for criminals‖); Dog-Fighting 
Raids, supra note 107; Burke, supra note 56; Ortiz, supra note 15, at 51; Silverman, supra note 36. 
 275. Patrick, supra note 1, at A1. 
 276. United States v. Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078, 1080–81 (8th Cir. 2011); Brief of Defendant-
Appellant at 1–6, United States v. Hackman, 630 F.3d 1078 (8th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3948); Hamilton, 
supra note 8; RFTVSTL, Behind the Scenes of the Biggest Pit Bull Fighting Bust in U.S. History, 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OHq2oSis3YA. 
 277. See, e.g., Indictment at 2, United States v. Morgan, No. 4:09-cr-00441-CEJ (E.D. Mo. July 1, 
2010), ECF No. 2. 
 278. See supra note 155.  
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The third DOJ consideration examines if RICO charges would allow a 
combination of offenses from different jurisdictions into a single case.
279
 
This is particularly applicable to dogfighting because of its interstate 
nature. In particular, this consideration should weigh heavily in favor of 
allowing a RICO charge where it allows consolidating predicate gambling 
offenses based on various state laws. 
The fourth DOJ consideration allows RICO prosecutions where it 
would be necessary to a successful case against the defendant or a co-
defendant.
280
 While this could potentially apply to dogfighting cases, 
reliance on this consideration would appear to be case-specific. 
The fifth DOJ consideration allows RICO prosecutions to ―provide a 
reasonable expectation of forfeiture which is proportionate to the 
underlying criminal conduct.‖281 Dogfighting cases present a unique need 
for effective forfeiture. While conviction of an Animal Welfare Act 
offense (such as dogfighting) allows forfeiture of animals and collection of 
related care and veterinary treatment costs, it does not provide an avenue 
for attacking assets gained through dogfighting.
282
 As a result, the worst 
that befalls a dogfighter is the loss of valuable breeding stock and time 
invested in training. The basic infrastructure of the illicit business remains. 
Utilizing RICO‘s powerful forfeiture provisions would provide a check 
that could help curb this conduct. 
Both the sixth and seventh DOJ considerations concern prosecutions 
based on state law, limiting such cases to incidents where local officials 
―are unlikely or unable to successfully prosecute the case,‖ or cases 
involving high-profile or government officials. Where RICO prosecutions 
target interstate rings, these considerations will likely be moot. In many 
other cases, the inclusion of federal offenses in the indictment may also 
weigh against DOJ deference to this consideration. In those cases that rely 
exclusively on state law predicate offenses, the pervasive rarity of 
dogfighting prosecutions in many jurisdictions may itself signal an 
inability to prosecute, justifying DOJ‘s assistance.283 Furthermore, a 
simple request for prosecutorial assistance may demonstrate local 
difficulties.
284
  
 
 
 279. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, supra note 214, § 9-110.310. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. 7 U.S.C. § 2156(f) (2000). 
 283. See Ortiz, supra note 15, at 26–27. 
 284. See H.R. REP., supra note 147, at 2 (noting that there had been ―numerous . . . requests [for 
Federal Prosecutors] to assist with state and local prosecutions‖ of animal fighters). 
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Thus, multiple DOJ considerations will likely be impacted in any 
RICO case involving dogfighting. While the exact impact of these 
considerations will vary with the structure of the indictment, approval 
should not be an insurmountable challenge to the dogfighting RICO 
indictment.  
CONCLUSION 
In many cases, charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act may be appropriate to bolster dogfighting prosecutions. 
This application of RICO is appropriate given the pervasive, organized 
nature of dogfighting, the interstate character of fighting rings, and the 
multifaceted associated crimes.  
Applying RICO to dogfighters could yield many benefits. Primary 
among them would be the availability of increased penalties and strong 
asset forfeiture provisions. These penalties could serve to reduce the 
dramatic disparity between the investigation/prosecution costs of 
dogfighting and the punishment of offenders. Furthermore, RICO 
prosecutions could more adequately represent the numerous crimes that go 
into a dogfighting ring without unmanageable and unwieldy indictments, 
and avoiding some of the proof problems inherent in the typical 
dogfighting statute.  
Such an application of RICO may better serve criminal law objectives 
than current Animal Welfare Act prosecutions. Increased prison sentences 
may better serve to create general deterrence within the dogfighting 
community. Since RICO would be best suited for attacking the most 
organized offenders, this would be particularly valuable to making 
examples of dogfighting ―leaders.‖ Additionally, because RICO holds the 
possibility of better seizing dogfighting assets and equipment, it could 
increase individual deterrence by both eliminating profits and hampering 
possible recidivism—upon conviction, a professional fighter would be 
forced to start from scratch to rebuild his kennel.  
The business-like quality of the crime lends itself well to criminal 
RICO prosecution. However, application of RICO in the dogfighting 
context will require investigators to look beyond the animal cruelty and 
into the surrounding criminal activities—gambling, drug use, etc.—that 
often surround dogfighting ventures. Investigators and prosecutors may do 
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well to heed ―Deep Throat‘s‖ timeless advice to Bob Woodward: ―Follow 
the money.‖285 
Matthew C. Heger  
 
 
 285. Timeless, but fictional. The oft-quoted line was actually the creation of Hollywood writer 
William Goldman, not the instructions of Mark Felt, the real-life ―Deep Throat.‖ Frank Rich, Don’t 
Follow the Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/12/opinion/12rich. 
html; ALL THE PRESIDENT‘S MEN, at 00:40:24 (Warner Bros. Pictures 1976). 
  J.D. (2012), Washington University School of Law; B.S. (2004), Southeast Missouri State 
University. Thank you to my wife, Amanda Stogsdill, for her tremendous support and the topic 
suggestion; the editors of Washington University Law Review; and Prof. Francesca Ortiz, South Texas 
College of Law, for her scholarship and time. I am grateful to the Humane Society of Missouri, the 
Missouri Highway Patrol, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys in several states for valuing the lives of more 
than 500 American Pit Bull Terriers, including one slobbering, bumbling dog named Carlos. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
